



## Nigeria: Anticipatory actions towards General Elections



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|                                 |   |  |   |
|---------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Appeal:<br><b>MDRNG036</b>      | DREF Allocated:<br><b>CHF 66,714</b>        | Crisis Category:<br><b>Yellow</b>  | Hazard:<br><b>Other</b>                 |
| Glide Number:<br><b>N/A</b>     | People at risk:<br><b>20,000,000 people</b> | People Targeted:<br><b>2,000,000 people</b>  |   |
| Event Onset:<br><b>Imminent</b> | Operation Start Date:<br><b>2023-02-08</b>  | Operation End Date:<br><b>2023-04-30</b>   | Operation Timeframe:<br><b>2 months</b> |
|                                 | Targeted Areas:                             | <b>Abia, Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Enugu, Federal Capital Territory, Gombe, Imo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, Zamfara</b> |   |

# Description of the Event

## Approximate date of impact

25 February 2023 - Presidential/National Assembly election

11 March 2023 - Governorship/State Assembly election


INEC has shared election calendar one year ago and since, analysis from various sources detailed below are forecasting a high risk of violence to be experienced during this period. NRCS will monitor the situation through Movement field reports, information from Government on election course, international and national verified media reports.



**Nigeria: Anticipatory Actions towards General Elections**  
IFRC/ICRC BRANCH SUPPORT  
Date 08/02/2023



The maps used do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies or National Societies concerning the legal status of a territory or of its authorities.  
Sources: NRCS



## What is expected to happen?

By virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), tenure of the President, Vice President, Governors and Deputy Governors of States of the Federation (except Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Imo, Kogi, Ondo and Osun States) will expire on the 28th day of May 2023 while the National and State Assemblies will stand dissolved on the 8th day of June 2023.

Pursuant to Sections 76(2), 116(2), 132(2) and 178(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), elections to the said offices shall hold not earlier than One Hundred and Fifty (150) days and not later than Thirty (30) days before the expiration of the term of office of the last holder of that office. It's in line with this provision and the Regulations of the Independent National Electoral Commission (hereinbefore referred to as "the Commission") released the timeline of elections include presidential elections and Provincial Governors elections to follow each other. Last turn for presidential election started 28 February 2022, given the greenlight for electoral campaign. Now the country is less than a month ahead of the election with the electoral calendar as until the end

of elections:

- 30 January 2023: Publication of Notice of Poll by the commission
- 23 February 2023: Last day for campaigns by political parties for Presidential and National Assembly
- 9 March 2023: Last day for campaigns by political parties for Governorship and state Houses of Assembly
- 25 February 2023: Date of Election for Presidential and National Assembly
- 11 March 2023: Date of Election for Governorship and state Houses of Assembly

Whereas this DREF targets only the presidential/national assembly elections holding on 25 February 2023, in the event that the election goes as scheduled without a rerun election or breakdown of law and order to destruct the calendar, this DREF will be updated to also cover the governorship/state assembly election scheduled to hold on 11th March 2023.

| ALL AT RISK PROVINCES |             |             |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| S/NO                  | DREF Target | ICRC Target |
| 1                     | AKWA IBOM   | ABIA        |
| 2                     | ANAMBRA     | ADAMAWA     |
| 3                     | BAYELSA     | BAUCHI      |
| 4                     | EBONYI      | BENUE       |
| 5                     | EDO         | BORNO       |
| 5                     | EKITI       | CROSS RIVER |
| 7                     | FCT         | DELTA       |
| 8                     | GOMBE       | ENUGU       |
| 9                     | IMO         | KADUNA      |
| 10                    | JIGAWA      | KANO        |
| 11                    | KATSINA     | NASARAWA    |
| 12                    | KEBBI       | PLATEAU     |
| 13                    | KOGI        | RIVERS      |
| 14                    | KWARA       | TARABA      |
| 15                    | LAGOS       | YOBE        |
| 16                    | NIGER       | ZAMFARA     |
| 17                    | OGUN        |             |
| 18                    | ONDO        |             |
| 19                    | OSUN        |             |
| 20                    | OYO         |             |
| 21                    | SOKOTO      |             |
| 21 states             |             | 16 states   |

## Why your National Society is acting now and what criteria is used to launch this operation.

As the federal and state elections approach, set for February and March 2023 respectively, election-related political unrest has started to increase. During the May 2022 presidential primaries held by the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) and the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP), several deadly incidents of political violence were reported (<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/27/nigeria-ruling-party-top-opposition-hold-presidential-primaries>).

Following many expert analysis, including UN article published 2 February 2023 and Human Right Watch of 6 February 2023, it is expected that election-related violence will intensify further before the elections as a result of insecurity threats or risks in many parts of the country likely to increase, concerns on accountability and violence for past elections and socio-economical challenges faced by the population. Past elections have created also disturbance which increased the possibility of facing the same scenario.

Insecurity is hindering election preparations in various parts of Nigeria, and could disrupt the polls in multiple ways. Attacks by armed groups on communities and electoral commission offices, as well as fears of further attacks, particularly in the southeast, are affecting campaigning in some areas. Over three million people have been displaced by conflicts in recent years, which could lead to many being unable to vote if they cannot reach their designated polling places. The national electoral commission has stated that it will make provisions for internally displaced persons to vote at their camps, but most of these people are not in designated camps and are instead living with family or other hosts in various towns. Armed groups may also discourage turnout or prevent voting entirely in some areas. There have been at least 10,000 deaths and over 5,000 abductions due to armed conflict in Nigeria from January to mid-December 2022, according to a tally by the Crisis Group and reports from reputable Nigeria-based NGOs. Some 550 out of 774 local government areas have also seen incidents of armed conflict during this period. Jihadist militants continue to destabilize parts of the country, and herder-farmer conflict persists in the north-central

zone. In the southeast, government forces are battling various groups, including pro-Biafra separatists and criminal bands. There is also a risk of politicians buying votes, particularly from poor and vulnerable citizens, on a larger scale than in the past. This could compromise the integrity of the election and undermine confidence in the results. Tensions related to campaigning have already resulted in violence in various states, and there is a risk of further incidents during or after the polls (<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/countdown-begins-nigerias-crucial-2023-elections>).

Nigeria is facing increasing uncertainty as deadly attacks on electoral offices and vote-buying become more prevalent. The actions of ruthless politicians are threatening the country's already fragile democracy. Many parts of the country are currently unsafe, with Boko Haram/ISWAP and other extremist groups operating in the northeast, bandits in the northwest, Fulani herdsmen causing terror and ethnic cleansing in the north-central, kidnappers, cultists, and violent transport union enforcers causing problems in the southwest, and gunmen and separatist agitators causing havoc in the southeast and south-south.

In addition to the risk of violence, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is concerned about the widespread practice of buying Permanent Voter Cards. This issue has been prevalent in past elections in Nigeria, including recent off-season governorship elections in Edo, Ekiti, Anambra, Osun, and Ondo states. Despite efforts by INEC to discourage vote-buying through measures such as banning smartphones at voting booths and redesigning the booths, politicians continue to find creative ways to bypass these safeguards.

There are several threats to the credibility and peacefulness of the upcoming elections in Nigeria. Non-state armed groups such as Boko Haram, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and "bandit" gangs have expressed a desire to undermine the country's democracy. These groups have shown a level of sophistication and lethality that should be causes for concern. Past elections in Nigeria have been prone to violence, and there is a risk of widespread social unrest being triggered by the current election. This risk is further exacerbated by the ruling party choosing presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the same faith and the proliferation of disinformation on social media (<https://institute.global/policy/democracy-under-threat-why-security-risks-nigerias-2023-elections-must-not-be-overlooked>).

Although International Crisis Group reported uncharged situations in November 2022, it however stated that many of the 36 states are at risk of violence around the presidential, gubernatorial and legislative elections, depending on the actions of key political actors, local inter-communal relations and dynamics around the polls. States where voters are polarized along ethnic and religious lines seem at special peril of turmoil, along with states where support for candidates of differing communal identities is high or where outgoing governors seem bent on installing hand-picked successors. (<https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/december-alerts-and-november-trends-2022#nigeria>). States where incidents could occur are those where separatist agitators and other opportunistic groups have been increasingly violent. Violence could also erupt after the polls, particularly where the elections suffered significant lapses or where tallies are close, with losing candidates either stirring up protests or refusing to calm their supporters. The most troubling indicators seem to be in Lagos, Rivers, Kaduna and Kano states, but also in South East states such as Ebonyi and Imo.

Other factors considered the potential to trigger election violence include

- The Impact of COVID-19 and other humanitarian crisis: The COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian challenges the past years have had a devastating impact on several major sectors of Nigeria's economy, disrupted society, and increased the country's debt burden. The pandemic has eroded economic power for many people and pushed more into poverty, which is likely to be a significant issue in the upcoming elections as more Nigerians struggle with growing socio-economic disparities in their society. This could exacerbate the divide between the upper class and the middle and lower class and potentially lead to violence.

It is estimated that approximately five per cent of the total population of Nigeria (estimated to be over 200 million people - <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/>) will be at risk in the eventuality of an outbreak of election violence in the 2023 General Elections.

Through this DREF operation, NRCS aims to prepare to reach out to at least 2,000,000 people (333,333HH) in all 37 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). However, through Movement coordination, this DREF will cover 21 states while the ICRC agreed to cover the remaining 16 states.

## Scope and Scale

Electoral processes, including in transitional and established democracies, can be at risk during the pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral periods. In 2023, Nigeria will hold elections while facing numerous economic, environmental, and security issues. Many areas of the country are facing significant insecurity, with the northern states experiencing ongoing conflicts with violent jihadist groups, criminal gangs, and other armed groups attacking local communities. In the south, there is ongoing civil unrest and violence between farmers and herders as well as insurgent activity. As the campaign for national and state elections intensifies, large rallies could increase existing security concerns and exacerbate existing partisan and factional tensions.

The overall instability in Nigeria is likely to have an impact on the upcoming elections. Due to the potential for tension and disturbances during elections, based on past experiences. Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigeria has consistently experienced election-related violence. Independence has been marred by violence. Multiple media and international observers as Human Right Workers reported deaths and acts of violence during the electoral campaign. Historical trend can be analyzed through the below publications: <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrrrev/article/view/72297/61230>). In 1964/5, the first election in the country was met with outrage and violence, resulting in the loss of more than 200 lives (<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nigeria1007/3.htm> and <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/10/nigeria-widespread-violence-ushers-presidents-new-term>)([https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357252191\\_The\\_Fall\\_of\\_the\\_Second\\_Republic\\_of\\_Nigeria\\_1979\\_-1983\\_A\\_Lesson\\_for\\_the\\_Future](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357252191_The_Fall_of_the_Second_Republic_of_Nigeria_1979_-1983_A_Lesson_for_the_Future)).

- While the 1993 presidential election was generally considered to be the most free and fair in the country's history, it was not without controversy. The decision by the Ibrahim Babangida-led military administration to annul the election led to widespread public outrage and protests. Campaign for Democracy (CD) reported (<https://www.hrw.org/reports/NIGERIA938.PDF>) that over 100 peaceful demonstrators and bystanders were killed by security forces attempting to quell the violence that arose from the July protests (<https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/07/world/rioting-in-nigeria-kills-at-least-11.html>).

- Little has changed since Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 too. After allegations of fraud in the 1999 election that brought Olusegun Obasanjo to power, there were numerous instances of violence throughout the country. It is believed that around 80 people died as a result ([https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Post-1999-elections-and-violence\\_tbl1\\_281498632](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Post-1999-elections-and-violence_tbl1_281498632)). In the 2003 federal and state elections, at least 100 people were killed in violent incidents (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>). In 2007, over 300 people died in connection to electoral violence, with more than 70 lives lost due to pre-election violence alone (<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/africa/nigeria0407/nigeria0407web.pdf>).

- In 2011, post-election violence resulted in the deaths of at least 800 people over three days of rioting in 12 states in northern Nigeria, making it the worst case of political violence in the country's history. The violence was sparked by widespread protests by supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from the Congress for Progressive Change, after incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta in the south and the candidate for the ruling People's Democratic Party, was re-elected. This information was reported by Human Rights Watch (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>).

- During and after the 2015 general elections, over 100 people lost their lives (<https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-s-2019-elections-six-states-watch>), according to the International Crisis Group. The European Union Election Observation Mission reported that approximately 150 people were killed due to violence related to the 2019 national elections (<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/343971-626-killed-during-2019-nigeria-elections-report.html>). There are various factors that have been suggested as contributing to the persistent challenges faced by elections in Nigeria, including weak governance, ineffective security forces, poverty and unemployment, abuse of power, political alienation, a climate of impunity, a 'winner-takes-all' political system, and the proliferation of small arms.

- From April 2014 to May 2022, at least 350 people were reportedly killed in electoral violence in Nigeria, according to Nigeria Security Tracker (The Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), a project of the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, documents and maps violence in Nigeria that is motivated by political, economic, or social grievances). In the same period, 51 others, mostly officials from the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), were

reportedly abducted.

With regards to the upcoming 2023 General Elections period, Security will continue to be a major concern for voters in Nigeria as they select their next president, as it has been in previous elections. The government and local authorities are struggling to control armed groups that contribute to ongoing political and security issues throughout the country. Over the past weeks as campaigning, town halls, and rallies have increased in preparation for the election, there has also been a rise in election-related violence. This violence has involved political party affiliates, supporters, and individuals seeking to profit from the election.

Two major issues have been at the forefront of the news in the last quarter of 2022. One issue is the increase in violence targeting facilities run by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the body responsible for managing elections in Nigeria. This violence has caused concerns about the safety of electoral officials and the ability to hold elections throughout the country. The other major issue is the way in which the electoral campaign has fueled media polarization, with attacks against media outlets perceived as partisan. These attacks raise questions about the relationship between the government and media organizations that are not perceived as friendly. These developments are coming at a time of increased socio-economic instability, with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) announcing that 130 million Nigerians currently live in poverty (<https://www.nigeriapovertymap.com/>) and the recent floods in Nigeria which caused over 600 fatalities and the displacement of approximately 1.4 million people. These events are likely to lead to increased strain on local communities and potentially cause conflicts over resources.

While the main focus should be on promoting peace and preventing conflict, past instances of violence have shown the need to prepare for potential humanitarian response efforts. The potential for humanitarian consequences as a result of the upcoming election in Nigeria has prompted the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement to consider necessary preventive measures. The NRCS is taking steps to anticipate and mitigate any negative impact on the humanitarian situation that may occur before, during, and after the election.

## Previous Operations

|   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| Has a similar event affected the same area(s) in the last 3 years?    | <b>Yes</b>                          |
| Did it affect the same population groups?                             | <b>Yes</b>                          |
| Did the National Society respond?                                     | <b>Yes</b>                          |
| Did the National Society request funding from DREF for that event(s)? | <b>Yes</b>                          |
| If yes, please specify which operations                               | <b>MDRNG019 2014, MDRNG026 2019</b> |

### **If you have answered yes to all questions above, justify why the use of DREF for a recurrent event, or how this event should not be considered recurrent**

Past election was in 2019. Humanitarian risk of Election in Nigeria is always a concern due to existing in-country factors and challenges favorable for escalation of violence. The volatile security context of the recent years and past experience of violence and protestations are indicators showing a likely of the situation to be at risk for the communities, especially the already at risk. The elections in 2019 have taken place in the same context with background of suspicious allegations and reported incident and people killed along the campaign. The reported death linked by observers during political campaign have increased following the various electoral campaign. This year, more than previous years reflects an increased economical pression in the communities, the population is more vulnerable, some more exposed and the context affected by humanitarian crisis, socio-political and security concerns. These are considerations explaining the need for National Society (NS) to play its role to be ready to support the community while analysis from various sides anticipates a challenging electoral phase based on all the above. As auxiliary of Government, the Nigerian Red Cross Society (NRCS) must play a key role in the affairs of humanitarian assistance in that scenario.

**Specify how the lessons learnt from these previous operations are being used to mitigate similar challenges in the current operation**

Challenges:

- The release of funds was delayed, but it was addressed by the NS providing pre-financing for certain urgent activities, which were later reimbursed.
- The materials arrived on schedule, but some branches experienced difficulties in distributing them to their respective divisions.

Learnings included the following:

- It is necessary to engage in early planning, involving the branches in the process.
- It is ideal for deliveries to be made two months prior to election day.

Considering the above challenges faced and learnings, NRCS has ensured in advance strategic coordination meetings with ICRC and IFRC to establish a work dynamic at country level to facilitate fund availability even as a pre-funding mechanism and information sharing mechanism between partners and branches. All the teams from different states have been consulted for the planning and the branches management but also Response team will be involved in initial briefings to agree on implementation and reporting system in advance.

## Current National Society Actions

|                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| <b>Coordination</b>               | Movement coordination meetings are being held regularly and Election Operations Meetings have also commenced and will be sustained throughout the implementation of this DREF. The coordination meeting led to a Movement approach to the election preparedness where the IFRC agreed to bear the cost of the operation in 21 states and the ICRC bears the cost of the operation in 16 states of the federation.   |
| <b>National Society Readiness</b> | To be prepared for potential conflicts, NRCS has implemented a monitoring system that includes the surveillance and analysis of early warning signs of conflict and the creation of maps to identify high-risk areas for conflict using the Nigeria Election Tracker developed by The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).<br><br>NRCS has taken steps to enhance the capabilities of its branch teams to effectively deal with the consequences of violent conflicts. As part of these efforts, the NRCS has completed training for 50 Emergency First Aid Teams (EFATs) in 16 branches. Twelve (12) EFATs have been trained in Ekiti and Osun in preparation for the 2022 governorship elections in Ekiti and Osun states (the 2 states are part of the states with off-season governorship elections). The NRCS has also begun a process to reactivate its National Disaster Response Teams (NDRTs) throughout the country.<br><br>These training sessions will equip volunteers with the skills and knowledge needed to provide first aid, psychosocial first aid, and emergency relief services. In accordance with the mandate of the RCRC, the NRCS will use these trainings to emphasize the importance of non-politicized communication and actions and upholding the 7 fundamental principles when carrying out volunteer duties. |
| <b>National Society EOC</b>       | The Nigerian Red Cross Society has also set up an EOC at the NHQ since February 2023 to begin daily monitoring of events and receive reports from the branches for the effective and efficient running of the operation.  |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <b>Activation Of Contingency Plans</b> | The NRCS has developed the 2023 general election contingency plan in September 2022 and this was subsequently shared with all Movement partners in-country. |
|--|---|

## Movement Partners Actions Related To The Current Event

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>IFRC</b>                             | <p>IFRC has an office in Abuja, Nigeria that supports the Nigerian Red Cross Society in various programs related to preparedness for and response to disasters. In recent years, the IFRC has supported the NRCS in responding to COVID-19 and other epidemics, such as cholera. Since 2021 the IFRC has been working with the NRCS to address the food insecurity crisis in the North-West and North-Central regions of Nigeria through the IFRC Africa Regional Hunger Crisis Emergency Appeal.</p> <p>In anticipation of floods in 2022, the IFRC allocated a DREF to allow the NRCS to conduct necessary readiness activities. The IFRC will provide technical and operational coordination to the NRCS through its operations team and the NRCS will lead the implementation of all activities supported by this DREF, with the support and coordination of the IFRC and other IFRC members. As a primary national partner for disaster response in Nigeria, the NRCS facilitates disaster preparedness activities in the country as an auxiliary to the public authorities.</p> |
| <b>ICRC</b>                             | <p>The ICRC has an office in Abuja and is operational in the conflict-affected Northeast region. Regular Movement coordination meetings are ongoing as per the existing Movement Cooperation Agreement, ensuring a coordinated Movement approach to support the NRCS in preparedness, readiness and response efforts. The ICRC is supporting the NRCS in reinforcing its emergency response through emergency first-aid teams (EFAT) and restoring family links.</p> <p>This operation is in coordination with ICRC and Movement partners with a complementarity approach.</p>  |
| <b>Participating National Societies</b> | <p>The British Red Cross (BRC) is in-country and integrated under the IFRC secretariat, providing technical support in different sectoral areas, while the Italian Red Cross and Norwegian Red Cross are also closely coordinating their support for the NRCS with the IFRC.</p>  |

## Other Actors Actions Related To The Current Event

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Government has requested international assistance</b> | No   |
|  | <p>Actions of the government include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. The signing of the 2023 election peace accord by the presidential candidates to promote peaceful electioneering process. The peace accord was signed by candidates and was organized and supervised by the National Peace Committee. All the presidential candidates that signed the accord pledged among other things to run “issue-based campaigns” at all levels, and to refrain from making statements, pronouncements, declarations or speeches that were capable of inciting violence before, during and after the election.</li> <li>. Beef-up of security apparatus towards the conduct of the 2023 general</li> </ul> |

|                                    |  |
|------------------------------------|--|
| <p><b>National authorities</b></p> | <p>elections</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. National Orientation Agency (NOA) has organized a summit for political parties on curbing electoral violence in Nigeria.</li> <li>. The military has deployed troops across Nigeria to provide security during voting days and ensure that no one interferes with the electoral process. The troops have also been instructed to remain neutral during voting days and not take sides or interfere with any political party or candidate's campaign activities.</li> <li>. The military also provides training for INEC staff on how to conduct elections properly and safely.</li> <li>. The Inspector General of Police on 1st November, 2022 in collaboration with an International security consultancy company organized a retreat/conference for 162 senior police officers in Owerri, Imo State for 3 days. The retreat was tagged, 'The imperative of Nigeria police strategic plan for peaceful elections.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>UN or other actors</b></p>   | <p>External partners in country are following-up the situation.</p>  |

**Are there major coordination mechanisms in place?**

There is no coordination system already activated for emergency where NS is already taking part. But as part of national mechanism, the Civil protection will ensure the general coordination of electoral phase with Government electoral official structures as INEC and NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency). The NRCS will work closely with the Ministry of Health on emergency first aid possibility, evacuation system to put in place and with civil protection and NEMA before, during and after the elections. NRCS will keep NEMA and SEMA informed on the key preparedness activities to be implemented. There is also a coordination system in place among the Movement partners.

# Anticipated Needs



## Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation And Recovery

There is a need to improve coordination with external partners/actors to ensure the smooth communication, transfer of information and readiness for possible scenario. This is particularly important prior to the elections, as it is necessary to establish agreed-upon standard operating procedures for various potential scenarios. Without effective coordination, communication and information transfer may be disrupted, hindering the success of the election response.

The inability to access information from the branches to support operational planning, due to lack of computers and other devices, potential interruption of communication e.g., Internet shutdown or telephone lines cut increases the need for use of VHF radios to ensure.

The NS' response capacity could be jeopardized if there is insufficient equipment, such as first-aid kits, ambulances, and vehicles to transport teams, and insufficient fuel to support the response operation. Sourcing for these items during the election period may be risky as movements may be restricted. It is therefore important to ensure that these items are repositioned to ensure the full capacity of the NRCS in case of tensions.

Considering the possibility of tensions occurring before, during, and after the elections, it is important to establish a base for NRCS volunteers and staff where they can rest, receive psychosocial support (PSS), and share information gathered from working within the community to aid in strategic planning. This is especially important as volunteers and staff may need to spend several days away from their homes on operations. To effectively support this effort, it is important to decentralize the emergency operation centre (EOC) and have an operational base in each of the hotspot regions.

In total, 37 states are at risk. Even considering different level of risk, all the 37 states are likely to experience troubles and the need to keep vigilance is essential as all the states shared some of the key risk factors analyzed. Impartiality of NRCS needs to be maintained in this particular context. As such, the NS auxiliary role should be played in all the at-risk areas. Area at risk states and support by Movement is reflected in the table above.



## Health

During election violence it is essential to reduce morbidity, mortality and disability. Vulnerable groups such as the wounded, sick, children, pregnant women, lactating mothers, People living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs), victims of sexual violence, and traumatized may require medical attention.

If health and safety recommendations are not followed, NRCS volunteers and staff participating in activities may be exposed to potential tensions or conflicts, which could lead to injuries or fatalities. This could result in psychological trauma for both the affected communities and the volunteers/staff, requiring the need for psychosocial support.

# Operational Strategy

## Overall objective of the operation

The goal of this operation is to enhance the ability of NS volunteers to address humanitarian needs which could result from different elections scenario and possible election-related violence by ensuring readiness of NS team in the at-risk areas in coordination with partners.

This will be accomplished with a neutral and impartial approach to the coordinated support provided in the 37 states with funding coverage of the DREF to 21 States and ICRC support to 16.

Through scenario planning, these preparedness measures aim to empower NS trained staff and volunteers to provide first-aid services, psychosocial support, and promote peace messages to at least 2,000,000 individuals (333,333 households) in at-risk states during the campaign, voting, and result proclamation phases of the election period.

## Operation strategy rationale

The proposed operational strategy in line with the NRCS Contingency Plan considers the three key phases of the election period: pre-election, election day, and post-election.

### 1. Pre-Election Phase (Anticipatory Actions)

During this phase, the main activities will focus on training, coordination, and the prepositioning of necessary supplies. The NS will also form operational teams, provide refresher training, and deploy First Aid and PSS responders. The following actions will be carried out:

#### a) Strategic meeting for the 2023 general election at branch level

NRCS will hold a one-day strategic meeting with the representatives of the 37 branches and selected National Disaster Response Teams - NDRT - (one from each geopolitical zone) alongside the Movement partners in 5 locations. However, this DREF will cover the cost of the strategic meeting in 2 locations while the ICRC will cover the cost for the remaining 3 locations.

The strategic meeting will have one participant each from the 37 branches. Also, 6 NDRT members (one each for the 6 geopolitical zones). The meeting will hold at regional level simultaneously.

#### b) Coordination

- Operational Situation Room: NRCS will establish a national situation monitoring room at its headquarters or in another location chosen by the Secretary General. This operation centre will be operational before, during, and after the election.

- Collaboration with government and stakeholders: Conduct high-level meetings with relevant stakeholders to continuously discuss the mandate and mission of the NRCS as an auxiliary to the government but independent, impartial, and neutral in its humanitarian actions. These meetings will also serve as an opportunity to present the Red Cross emblem jackets and bibs that will be worn by staff and volunteers during the general election period to ensure easy identification and invoke the protective status of the emblem. The meetings will be held at various levels to ensure safer access for volunteers and promote a peaceful electoral process.

- Setting up Communication Channels: Establish proper and regular communication channels with authorities to ensure the safety of volunteers in the field and allow them to operate within the Red Cross mandate.

#### c) Deployment of First Aid Responders and PSS Support (2 days pre-election)

- 15 volunteers will be deployed in each branch (1 EFAT team) 2 days before the elections to monitor the situation. The teams will provide first aid, psychological first aid, and ensure referrals to nearby healthcare facilities if necessary. One supervisor each from the branch office will be deployed to manage each team.

#### d) Protection

If the elections result in widespread violence and displacement, the affected population will be at a higher risk for protection concerns, including an increase in sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children. Therefore, as a preparedness measure, NRCS will implement the following activities to support the elderly, people with disabilities, women, girls, and children in the event of violence and displacement:

- PGI FPs will form part of the EFAT teams in all branches. Further support will be provided in the situation.

#### e) Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA)

Community engagement and accountability (CEA) will be integrated into the entire election preparedness and response process as it is with all other projects and activities of NRCS to ensure maximum and meaningful participation of affected communities. NRCS will maintain active communication with the government, communities, humanitarian agencies, and other stakeholders to gain access to hotspots before, during, and after the elections. Through her hotlines and other feedback mechanisms, NRCS will receive and address all feedbacks. During the PGI briefing, volunteers will receive orientation on information management and community feedback and rumour control. Community feedback will be recorded, addressed, and incorporated into the operation to better align the response with community needs and enhance NRCS services.

#### 2. During Elections (1 day)

On election day, volunteers will be assigned the following tasks:

- First Aid: On election day, 15 volunteers will be deployed in each state to observe the situation and offer first aid and psychological first aid to those affected by election violence. They will also ensure that serious cases are promptly referred to the nearest healthcare centres. One branch staff will be deployed to monitor the teams in each branch.

#### 3. Post-Elections Phase (2 days)

- First Aid coverage: On the two days following the elections, 15 volunteers will be deployed in each state to monitor the situation and provide response (first aid and psychological first aid) in the event of post-election disputes. They will also ensure that necessary referrals are made to nearby healthcare facilities.

#### Lessons Learnt Workshop

A workshop will be held to share and discuss lessons learned. Participants from all targeted branches and partners will attend to ensure that lessons are documented and can inform future operations. To cut costs, the lessons learnt workshop will be held virtually.

If the situation progresses as described in event forecasts, NRCS may need to escalate the DREF to an Emergency Appeal to activate the response component, which may include activities such as:

- Expanding first aid and ambulatory services
- Distributing relief and providing humanitarian assistance
- Continuing to disseminate Red Cross/Red Crescent principles
- Continuing to promote safer access in high-risk areas
- Engaging in peace promotion activities in partnership with peace partners
- Coordinating with partners
- Providing treatment for cases of gender-based violence
- Supporting dead body management (safe and dignified burial).

## Targeting Strategy

### Who will be targeted through this operation?

It is estimated that approximately 20 million people will be at risk in the eventuality of an outbreak of election violence in the 2023 General Elections. Through this DREF operation, NRCS aims to prepare to reach out to at least 2,000, 000 people (333,333HH) in all 37 states and the FCT. However, through movement coordination, this DREF will cover 21 states while with ICRC support, NRCS will cover the remaining 16 states.

### Explain the selection criteria for the targeted population

The targeted states are selected based on past experience of elections, the areas where incidents have started to be recorded and update of analysis of how the situation evolves. EFAT reports will also be taken into consideration to adapt the priority actions and areas depending on potential hotspots.

Specific consideration will be given to areas around the voting points.

# Total Targeted Population

|                            |           |  |         |
|----------------------------|-----------|--|---------|
| Women:                     | 1,200,000 | Rural %                                | Urban % |
| Girls (under 18):          | -         | 70.00 %                                | 30.00 % |
| Men:                       | 800,000   | People with disabilities (estimated %) |         |
| Boys (under 18):           | -         | 10.00 %                                |         |
| Total targeted population: | 2,000,000 |  |         |

## Risk and security considerations

### Please indicate about potential operational risk for this operations and mitigation actions

| Risk   | Mitigation action  |
|--|--|
| Tensions related to politics and security  | Project-based risk assessments will be carried out and measures to mitigate risks implemented. Monitoring of the security environment. Training on Safer Access Framework modules will be provided to volunteers with the support ICRC. The importance of applying Safer Access Framework (SAF) will be emphasized during the training.  |
| Natural disasters and outbreaks of disease may occur.  | Nigeria just experienced a flood which is believed to be the worst flood in the last decade. The 2022 flood left over 600 dead with over 1.4 million displaced. This displacement has in some cases led to conflict due to competition for scarce resources – pasture and water. There have also been cases of cholera in some states.   |
| Possible increase in positive COVID-19 cases in targeted areas leading to lockdown or other government measures. | Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be distributed to staff and volunteers involved in the response. This DREF will take all the preventive measures for COVID-19 to reduce the risk on the side of the staff and volunteers of NRCS. Its operational strategy considers the risks related to the current COVID-19 pandemic and is aligned with the IFRC global Emergency Appeal that supports NS to deliver assistance and support to communities affected or at-risk of being affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.  |
| Increased workload for staff and volunteers already assigned to other interventions.                             | Staff and volunteers of NRCS are already responding to the Hunger Crisis through MDRNG032 Emergency Appeal and the 2022 Flood Emergency Appeal through MDRNG034. In addition to their other thematic and annual projects, staff and volunteers have been assigned additional tasks related to the national elections. To effectively manage all operations, the NS must devise a plan to distribute tasks and prioritize certain areas. By refocusing its strategy and prioritizing hot spots, the NS will be able to operate effectively within its capacity. |

### Please indicate any security and safety concerns for this operation

Overall, the security situation in Nigeria is complex and volatile. Nigeria is a country that faces a number of security risks, including terrorism, insurgency, and ethnic and religious violence. The country has been particularly affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the north, which has resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions of people. Nigeria has also faced a number of attacks by other extremist groups, such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The country also faces risks of ethnic and religious violence, particularly in the middle belt region where there have been a number of clashes between different groups.

In most urban areas, especially in the capital city, the most significant security risks come from violent and petty crimes. During national political events such as elections, the risk of unrest tends to increase. Threats to security may include spontaneous or planned protests and riots, harsh security crackdowns, vigilante roadblocks, and a potential rise in opportunistic crime due to political unrest.


Throughout the operations, the security manager based at headquarters will continue to provide security briefings through email and visits. The team leaders in the respective operational areas will continue to communicate with local officials and community leaders and update them on the situation.

To protect RCRC personnel from crime, violence, and road hazards, it will be implemented active risk mitigation measures and strict minimum-security requirements maintained. All NS and IFRC personnel participating in the operations will complete the IFRC security e-learning courses (Stay Safe Version 2) before deployment. Our security management for this operation will be guided by the RCRC's Fundamental Principles and humanitarian values. Additionally, we will implement the following security actions:


- Provision of regular security updates to all staff and volunteers involved in the operation.
- Use of the NRCS Situation room to monitor field activities in real-time.
- All staff and volunteers must have completed the Stay Safe courses and general security briefing sessions and must sign and commit to following the Code of Conduct.


# Planned Intervention

|   |                                       |  |           |
|---|---------------------------------------|--|-----------|
|            | <b>National Society Strengthening</b> | <b>Budget</b>  | CHF 9,192 |
|   |                                       | <b>Targeted Persons</b>  | 327       |
| <b>Indicators</b>   |                                       | <b>Target</b>  |           |
| Number of volunteers deployed   |                                       | 315  |           |
| Number of NDRT members deployed-deployed  |                                       | 5  |           |
| Number of staff and volunteers who have received appropriate briefing before being deployed |                                       | 327  |           |
| Number of feedbacks received and addressed through the established hotline                  |                                       | 1000   |           |
| <b>Priority Actions:</b>  |                                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Volunteers security will be ensured from the mobilisation to the end of the operation. As part of priority safety action, NS will ensure briefing and regular update security.</li> <li>• Team deployed will be ensured and will be coordinated by NDRTs</li> <li>• ICRC support on security monitoring will be an added value.</li> <li>• A feedback mechanism will be put in place and volunteers will be briefed on the concepts of CEA, PSS and protection to be able to manage the sensitivity of the situation and manage information. Community feedback will be documented, considered and used throughout the operation to tailor the response to community needs and improve the services of deployed teams.</li> <li>• Regular update on election progress on daily basis from branches</li> </ul> |           |

|   |                             |   |           |
|---|-----------------------------|---|-----------|
|  | <b>Secretariat Services</b> | <b>Budget</b>   | CHF 5,441 |
|   |                             | <b>Targeted Persons</b>   | 327       |
| <b>Indicators</b>   |                             | <b>Target</b>   |           |
| Monitoring and support visit by IFRC  |                             | 2   |           |
| <b>Priority Actions:</b>  |                             | IFRC will be supporting the coordination effort of NRCS and provide guidance on scenario analysis and actions to be undertaken by the NS. IFRC will take part also in strategic meeting to be held includes Movement and external meetings. |           |

|  |  |               |            |
|--|--|---------------|------------|
|  |  | <b>Budget</b> | CHF 35,041 |
|--|--|---------------|------------|

|   |  |  |         |
|---|--|--|---------|
|      | <b>Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation And Recovery</b> | <b>Targeted Persons</b>  | 2000000 |
|   |  |  |         |
| <b>Indicators</b>   |  | <b>Target</b>  |         |
| Number of coordination meeting conducted with movement partners                       |  | 5  |         |
| Number of coordination meeting conducted with Local authorities and external partners |  | 5  |         |
| <b>Priority Actions:</b>  |  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organise a 1-day strategic meeting in 2 locations (ICRC will support the cost of the strategic meeting in 3 locations)</li> <li>• Setting up of the National Situation room</li> <li>• Hold coordination meetings with the Government and stakeholders of the electoral process at the National and state levels</li> </ul> |         |

|   |               |  |            |
|---|---------------|--|------------|
|  | <b>Health</b> | <b>Budget</b>  | CHF 17,041 |
|   |               | <b>Targeted Persons</b>  | 2000000    |
| <b>Indicators</b>   |               | <b>Target</b>  |            |
| Round surveillance conducted by the EFAT  |               | 32   |            |
| Number of EFAT deployed under this operation                                      |               | 21   |            |
| Number of first aid provided  |               | 100  |            |
| Number of days for team mobilisation  |               | 9  |            |
| <b>Priority Actions:</b>  |               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deploy 15 volunteers in each branch to provide care to persons affected/injured before, during and after the 2023 presidential Election for 5 days (2 days pre-election, election day and 2 days post-election)</li> <li>• Deployment of 21 NRCS branch staff for 5 days to supervise the teams (1 per state) and 7 at HQ (2 days pre-election, election day and 2 days post-election)</li> <li>• Readiness of the NS for first-aid and PSS support will be ensured for the electoral days</li> </ul> |            |

## About Support Services

**How many staff and volunteers will be involved in this operation. Briefly describe their role.**

The human resource need of this operation will include;

- 5 staff members from its headquarters will support and facilitate the strategic meeting at the regional level and

- 7 staff of the headquarters will be deployed to support the operation with a range of responsibilities (pre-election, election and post-election).
- In addition, 315 volunteers and 21 coordinators in 21 branches will be mobilized to assist with the operation.
- IFRC Abuja Country Cluster delegation will also offer technical support to NRCS, and other departments such as logistics, human resources, finance, project monitoring and evaluation, and security will closely collaborate with NRCS to ensure the operation is successful, particularly in regards to election preparedness.

**Will surge personnel be deployed? Please provide the role profile needed.**

**If there is procurement, will it be done by National Society or IFRC?**

The NS will handle all procurement applicable for the operation.

**How will this operation be monitored?**

The NRCS monitoring and evaluation team, along with the operations team, will assist the implementation teams to ensure that the operation is delivered effectively, efficiently, and in a timely manner. The monitoring process will focus on meeting standards for humanitarian service delivery and following the humanitarian principles guiding the Movement's operations. Field monitoring and technical support visits may be conducted as needed.

The NRCS will work closely with the IFRC Abuja Country Cluster delegation to improve the implementation of the operation. The first round deployment of EFAT team and meetings with local actors will include both NS and IFRC. Support will be provided as necessary by partners in the monitoring of the situation in the 37 states at risk. After the intervention is completed, a workshop will be held to review the operation and identify lessons learned, and a report will be compiled and shared to inform future operations.

**Please briefly explain the National Societies communication strategy for this operation.**

Community engagement and accountability (CEA) will be integrated into the entire election preparedness and response process as it is with all other projects and activities of NRCS to ensure maximum and meaningful participation of affected communities. NRCS will maintain active communication with the government, communities, humanitarian agencies, and other stakeholders to gain access to hotspots before, during, and after the elections.

Through her hotlines and other feedback mechanisms, NRCS will receive and address all feedbacks. During the PGI briefing, volunteers will receive orientation on information management and community feedback and rumour control. Community feedback will be recorded, addressed, and incorporated into the operation to better align the response with community needs and enhance NRCS services.

# Budget Overview



## DREF OPERATION

### MDRNG036 - NIGERIA RED CROSS ANTICIPATORY ACTIONS TOWARDS ELECTIONS

#### Operating Budget

|   |               |
|---|---------------|
| <b>Planned Operations</b>                       | <b>52,081</b> |
| Shelter and Basic Household Items               | 0             |
| Livelihoods                                     | 0             |
| Multi-purpose Cash                              | 0             |
| Health  | 17,041        |
| Water, Sanitation & Hygiene                     | 0             |
| Protection, Gender and Inclusion                | 0             |
| Education                                       | 0             |
| Migration                                       | 0             |
| Risk Reduction, Climate Adaptation and Recovery | 35,041        |
| Community Engagement and Accountability         | 0             |
| Environmental Sustainability                    | 0             |
| <b>Enabling Approaches</b>                      | <b>14,632</b> |
| Coordination and Partnerships                   | 0             |
| Secretariat Services                            | 5,441         |
| National Society Strengthening                  | 9,192         |
| <b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>                             | <b>66,714</b> |

*all amounts in Swiss Francs (CHF)*

# Contact Information

For further information, specifically related to this operation please contact:

- **National Society contact:**

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- **IFRC Appeal Manager:** Bhupinder Tomar, Head of delegation, bhupinder.Tomar@ifrc.org

- **IFRC Project Manager:** Francis Salako, Operation coordinator, francis.salako@ifrc.org

- **IFRC focal point for the emergency:** Francis Salako, Operation coordinator, francis.salako@ifrc.org

- **Media Contact:**

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[Click here for the reference](#)